Public policy failures can take their toll on economic efficiency, ecological integrity, and even human lives. These failures are endemic to fisheries commons the world over. Recent issues of Field and Stream, Scientific American, and National Geographic all featured stories about the dire straits of our fisheries.

Now the Bering Sea brings tragic news of a third outcome of poor policy: dead fishermen. The seven crewmembers of the Seattle-based Pacesetter were safety conscious. They fell victim to callous policies which unnecessarily endanger lives of fishermen. The Alaskan crab fishery's open-access nature encourages a mad scramble for catches in excess of sustainable yield. The scramble is "mad" not only because it's exceedingly dangerous but because society is left worse off whether the risky fishermen succeed or fail. The system rewards overfishing, and it biases how and when to fish - even if fishermen die in the attempt.

Peaceful government policies kill people all the time (e.g. CAFE standards which trade blood for oil). Seldom are they so obvious and direct as in the fishery. When lost lives are compounded with squandered resources and fears of a global fishery crash, even politicians might place public interest above parochial advantage.

The tragedy of the fisheries commons became apparent after the 1960s, when world fish stocks collapsed under increasing fishing pressure. Reform proposals include banishing foreign fishing fleets, quotas, requiring primitive fishing techniques, and satellite surveillance. By examining the successes and failures of various efforts, we see what makes institutions succeed or fail.

They usually fail for one reason: appropriate responsibility for conservation lies not with beneficiaries -- fishery communities.

There are many examples of bureaucrats regulating from afar, legislators ruling from on high, and monitors watching from a distance. Remote institutions neglect local conditions. When central planners set rules, quotas, and limits, alien practices trump local traditions and customs.

Distant legislators, central planners, and bureaucrats rarely manage effectively. Regulations have adverse consequences, quotas lead to waste, and limits are broken. Policing and sanctioning of fishermen by outsiders is often misguided or absent. Low-cost means of monitoring and resolving conflicts can't be provided by underfunded state policemen and international courts. Local fishermen too easily subvert regulations, and foreigners make off with whatever fish they can while filling the coffers afar. Alien systems generally fail.

But some got it right. In Alanya, Turkey, a fishing village evolved an ingenious solution to their fishery in jeopardy of overfishing. By drawing lots for fishing locations at the beginning of each season, and then rotating to a new position each day, the number of fishermen in each spot is controlled. If anyone crosses into another's site, the fisherman there will certainly notice and has incentive to report it. No outside enforcer is required. Every fisherman's vested interest in their 'spot of the day' provides incentives to monitor. Limited entry and effective enforcement are low cost, stable, and local.

In the Philippines, reef fishermen using explosives and cyanide to capture exotic fish have sewn the seeds of the ecosystem's destruction by both overfishing and killing the coral reef. Establishing offshore marine sanctuaries, where explosives and cyanide are prohibited, has reversed the tide. Fishermen are behaving responsibly, and empty nets are starting to fill. Illegal night fishing by foreign fleets jeopardizes the rebounding fish sanctuaries. Local communities' authority to protect their resources must carry force and respect.

Managers of the South Pacific fisheries are widely credited with success. Vast ocean stretches are dotted with tiny island nations whose national incomes are dwarfed by the foreign companies fishing their waters. But those nations, against the odds, have formed an institution from the ground up. They implemented an integrated and coordinated management approach and avoided overcapitalization, wasteful regulation, and international conflict.

These cases provide valuable lessons. The stories of communities in Turkey, the Philippines, and the South Pacific, teach us that those with long-term vested interests in fishery viability usually act responsibly. People with a stake in the future, won't act like there's no tomorrow. In contrast, open-access fisheries invite disruptive outsiders with little incentive for sustainable behavior. That is why enduring institutions tend to flow from the community level. Fishing villages recognize the importance of preserving this resource. Their very livelihoods depend on it.

Successful reform links the economic health of the fishermen and managers with the biological health of the fishery. The fishermen and the fish both lose out if decisions about when, where, and how to fish are made by those not held accountable. Fishermen know more about local conditions and have stronger incentives to improve them. Bureaucrats and politicians don't benefit from a healthy fishery the way a fishing community does.

We can apply the important lessons of successful institutions to prevent future tragedies. Reforms can't bring back the Pacesetter. But their sacrifice might motivate responsible reform. This would be a great tribute to good men lost.